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HOUSING THE POOR UNDER THE SECTION 8
NEW CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
STEVEN H. BLUMENTHAL*
Until recently federal housing subsidy programs were designed to
serve two objectives. The first sought "to remedy the unsafe and un-
sanitary conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe and sani-
tary dwellings for families of low income."' The second goal was
economic: By promoting new housing projects, Congress hoped to
stimulate the economy and strengthen the construction industry.2
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, omitting
the second goal from its statement of policy, introduced a leased
housing program that shifts emphasis away from new construction by
changing the focus to revitalization of existing housing.3
The section 8 program, part of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, provides rental assistance for existing,
newly constructed, and substantially rehabilitated housing.4 Al-
though there is no statutory preference,5 many influences are trying
* B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975; J.D., Washington University,
1978.
1. United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
2. Id. 57 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, at S-13 (Dec. 1977) states that build-
ing materials and construction industries account for over 15% of the Gross National
Product (GNP), while the construction industry employs more than 5% of the labor
force.
3. Compare Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 201(a)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. 1975) with 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (Supp. 1975). These terms are defined at 24 C.F.R. §
880101(b) (1977) (new construction); 24 C.F.R. § 881.101(b) (1977) (new construc-
tion); 24 C.F.R. § 881.101(b) (1977) (substantially rehabilitated); 24 C.F.R. §
882,101(a)(2) (1977) (existing housing).
5. 24 C.F.R. § 880.103(a) (1977) provides that new construction shall be permitted
only where there is not a pre-existing adequate supply or HUD establishes a priority
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to shape section 8 into a new construction-only program.' The
building industry is urging the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to emphasize the portions of section 8 that en-
courage new construction.' Federal budget projections indicate a
heavy emphasis on new construction under the section 8 program.
In addition, most of the amendments to the program are designed to
further new construction. Whether this pressure will succeed, how-
ever, is an open question. This Note will attempt to assess some fun-
damental issues concerning the likelihood of the program's success if
primary emphasis is placed on constructing new housing for low in-
come families. Before examining the program in detail, an overview
of earlier housing subsidy programs is presented to better identify
trends in federal housing policy, and place the section 8 program in
perspective.
for new construction. The use of new construction is also dependent on the needs of a
community as stated in the housing assistance plan. Butsee H.R. REp. No. 634, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 60 reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4525.
6. The Conference Committee specifically rejected a Senate provision limiting
construction and substantial rehabilitation of units. CONFERENCE REPORT ON
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT of 1974, H.R. REP. No. 1279, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 311, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4463 [herein-
after cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
7. See Whitman, Federal Housing Assistance for the Poor: Old and New
Directions, 9 UB. LAW. 1, 25-26 (1977); Will the New Housing Law Work?, Bus.
WEEK, Mar. 31, 1975, at 78. Whitman argues that traditionally the most persuasive
argument for employing new construction is the shortage of adequate housing and the
fear that utilizing existing housing through a rent subsidy would inflate rents. Whit-
man, Federal Housing Assitancefor the Poor.- Old and New Directions, 9 URB. LAW.
1, 25-26 (1977). See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON URBAN HOUSING, THE REPORT
OF THE PRisIDENT"S COMM'N ON URBAN HousiNG-A DECENT HOME 39 (1968) (the
report forcasted a need for 26 million new or rehabilitated housing units within ten
years).
8. The budget for fiscal year 1975 provided for 300,000 leased units comprised of
225,000 new construction units and 75,000 existing units. In the budget for fiscal year
1976, it was estimated that 200,000 units would receive approval consisting of 150,000
new and 50,000 existing. The budget for fiscal year 1977 proposed to assist 400,000
units consisting of 125,000 new and 275,000 existing. Hearing on the HousingAuthor-
ization Act of 1976 Before the Subconm on Housing & Community Development of the
House Comm on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 72-75 (1976).
President Carter's budget proposals for fiscal year 1979 continues this tradition. See
Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1978, at 5, col. 2.
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SECTION 8 HOUSING
I. THE BACKGROUND: EARLY FEDERAL PUBLIC HOUSING
PROGRAMS
A. Conventional Public Housing
The United States Housing Act of 19379 signaled the federal gov-
ernment's first major effort to supply low rent housing.' 0 The basic
structure of the conventional public housing program remains
unaltered through recent years: The federal government provides
financial support to a local housing authority (LHA)" that enables
the latter to plan and operate housing for low-income families.' 2
Specifically, the LHA initiates the development process by submit-
ting a proposal to HUD that, if accepted, will result in loan funds for
preliminary project planning.' 3  After final approval of the project,
HUD enters into an Annual Contribution Contract (ACC), guaran-
teeing that the federal government will satisfy the principal and inter-
est payments on financing obtained by the authority for housing
construction.' 4 The LHA may then arrange for construction and,
after completion, the LHA selects tenants and maintains the pro-
ject. 15
Conventional housing program availability is limited to "low-in-
come families."' 6 To be eligible, a family's income must be below
9. 50 Stat. 888 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1436 (1970 & Supp. III 1973). For
the legislative history of the Act, see T. McDONNELL, THE WAGNER HOUSING ACT:
A CASE STUDY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1957).
10. The government made few attempts at providing inexpensive housing before
1937. These efforts are described in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON URBAN HOUSING,
THE REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT HOME 54-56
(1968); Catz, Historical and Political Background of Federal Public Housing Programs,
50 N.D.L. REv. 25 (1973).
11. Housing authorities are public corporations established and operated in ac-
cordance with local laws. The requisite enabling legislation now exists in all 50
states. See [1973] 3 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) Reference File 16:0101-47.
12. See generally D. MANDELKER, HOUSING SUBSIDIES IN THE UNITED STATES
AND ENGLAND 45-80 (1973).
13. NATIONAL HOUSING & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAW PROJECT, 1 HAND-
BOOK ON HOUSING LAW: GUIDE TO FEDERAL HOUSING, REDEVELOPMENT AND
PLANNING PROGRAMS, ch. IV, pt. II, at 3-5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING LAW
HANDBOOK].
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1410(a), (c) (1970).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (1970).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970). Prior to 1974, public housing was available solely
to families of low income.
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the authorized ceiling,17 and if the income rises above a "continued
occupancy" level, the LHA must evict the resident family.18 Rent
levels "within the financial reach of families of low income" are set
by the LHA consistent with the congressional definition of public
housing. 9 In 1969 Congress passed the Brooke Amendment, limit-
ing the authority of the LHA to set rent levels by establishing a maxi-
mum permissible rental charge equivalent to one-fourth of the
tenant's monthly income.20
During the last twenty years, the conventional public housing
program has received extensive criticism. 21 Among the program's
drawbacks are a relatively poor design and appearance of low-rent
developments, and massive racial and economic concentration, and
thus segregation, that often accompanies public housing develop-
ments.22 In response to these problems, Congress established a leas-
ing program in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965.23
B. Section 23
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 contained a dif-
ferent approach than the conventional public housing program to the
problem of providing housing for low-income families. Under this
program, commonly referred to as section 23, the LHA's role
changed from landlord to tenant. The LHA was authorized to lease
17. HousiNG LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, ch. IV, pt. V, at 9.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(3) (1970). The over-income families could not be evicted
if the LHA determined that they could not reasonably afford decent housing in the
private market.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970), as amended (Supp. III 1973).
20. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, § 213(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1)
(1970). The tenant's monthly income is determined according to a statutory scheme
that includes numerous deductions and exemptions. Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1970, § 208(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970), as amended (Supp. III 1973);
HoUsING LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, ch. IV, pt. V, at 8-9.
21. L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING (1968); NAT'L COMM.
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, How THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUILDS
GHETTOES (1968); Catz, Historical and Political Background of Federal Public
Housing, 50 N.D.L. REv. 25 (1973); Friedman & Krier, .4 New Lease on Lie: Section
23 Housing and the Poor, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 611 (1968); Friedman, Public Housing
and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CAL. L. REV. 642 (1966).
22. See generally Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor An Overview, 54 CAL.
L. REv. 642 (1966).
23. See 79 Stat. 451 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1421b (1970)), which added § 23 to
the Housing Act of 1937.
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suitable units in privately-owned buildings and, in turn, sublease
them to low-income tenants.24 To obtain funds, the LHA was re-
quired to present HUD with a project application that described the
local need for housing assistance and availability of acceptable va-
cant units.2 5 If the proposal was accepted, HUD and the Authority
then executed an ACC.26
The LHA leased units offered by private owners if the dwellings
qualified as "decent, safe and sanitary." Although section 23 re-
quired that a maximum of ten per cent of the units in any structure
be placed under assistance, the LHA could waive this provision and,
in fact, this distribution quota had little practical effect.2 7
Theoretically, the program had many advantages over the conven-
tional approach. 28 First, since the program applied to existing units,
it offered the possibility of providing decent housing without the de-
lays associated with new construction. Second, the program could be
implemented with flexibility, providing housing assistance only
where needed. Similarly, a tenant could not be evicted from leased
housing because of excessive income. Rather, the LHA reduced the
subsidy to a point where the tenant no longer required assistance.
Third, the prospect of assured tenancy might motivate landlords to
improve and maintain their units. Section 23 held many social
promises as well, since housing would not be stigmatized as housing
for the poor, and the program carried a great potential for better ra-
cial and economic integration.
24. Section 23 utilized existing private accommodations that were or could be
suitable for tenancy by eligible families. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b (a)(1) (1970). See
generally Christensen, The Public Housing Leasing Program: A Workable Rent
Subsidy, 1968 URBAN L. ANN. 57; Palmer, Section 23 Housing: Low-Rent Housing in
Private Accommodations, 48 J. URB. L. 255 (1970).
25. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, No. RHA 7430.1 Low-
RENT HOUSING: LEASED HOUSING HANDBOOK ch. 2, § 1, at 1 (Nov. 1969) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SECTION 23 HANDBOOK].
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1421(d) (1970). HUD's annual contribution was statutorily lim-
ited to the cost of constructing an equivalent, conventional public housing project.
Id. at § 1421b(3).
27. Id. at § 1421b(c). See Friedman & Krier, supra note 21, at 618-19. Palmer,
Section 23 Housing: Low-Rent Housing in Private Accommodations, 48 J. URB. L. 255
(1970).
28. A general discussion of the expected benefits of section 23 can be found in
H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-15 (1965); Friedman & Krier, supra note
21, at 616-36. See W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBURG, URBAN HOUSING POLICY 37
(1975).
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Although the promises of section 23 were not fully realized, the
program was used extensively throughout the country.29 Moreover,
section 23 became the vehicle through which the Nixon Administra-
tion chose to advance its own solution to the housing problem.
Although the Administration advocated utilizing a housing allow-
ance, 30 Congress chose to amend section 23. The revised program,
section 8, became the primary means of assisting in housing lower-
income families.
C. Section 236
Section 236 of the Housing and Development Act of 1968 provided
an alternative strategy for housing low-income families.3 1 Under
section 236, the government provided an incentive for constructing
low-income apartments through a debt subsidy.32 Specifically, the
developer obtained an FHA insured market rate project mortgage.
Repayment of the mortgage was made as though the loan bore a be-
low market interest rate, typically one per cent.33 The government
was then responsible for the balance of the mortgage payment.
To ensure that these new units were affordable to low- and moder-
ate-income families, the developer was required to pass on the sav-
ings from lower interest rates through reduced rents. Tenants were
required to pay up to twenty-five per cent of their adjusted income
toward the rent. As with the section 23 program, eligibility was de-
termined at the initial leasing period, and a tenant whose income rose
thereafter increased rental payments rather than being forced to va-
29. Section 23-Public Housing Leasing Program, 31 J. HOUSING 73 (1974).
30. CONG. REc. 30362, 30365 (1973) (President Nixon's message to Congress).
This approach is analogous to welfare in that eligible families are given direct cash
payments as a means of supplementing their economic capacity to obtain decent
housing. See H. AARON, SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES: WHO BENEFITS FROM FEDERAL
HOUSING POLIciEs? (1972); Welfeld, Rent Supplements and the Subsidy Dilemma, 32
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 465 (1961). Congress authorized an experimental use of
housing allowances in 1970. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, § 504, 84
Stat. 1786, as amended, Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 804,
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-3 (Supp. V 1975)).
31. Housing and Community Development Act of 1968, § 201(a), (codified in
scattered sections 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701g-1715 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 1215) (1970).
32. Tatar, The Investor and the Section 236 Housing Program, 8 Hous. L. REV.
876 (1971); 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1073 (1970); 8 Hous. L. REv. 911 (1971); 31 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 443 (1970).
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l(f) (1970). See generally, HUD HANDBOOK: RENTAL
HOUSING FOR LOwER-INcoME FAMILIES (Section 236), (FHA 4442.1 Oct. 1968).
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cate the project.34
Unlike the section 23 program, section 236 was designed solely to
spur new construction of multi-family dwellings. Once again, how-
ever, the program did not live up to its potential.35  Basically, the
program failed because the mortgage subsidy proved inadequate in a
period of rapidly inflating utility costs and real estate taxes. Since
the tenant's rent was fixed at twenty-five percent of his income, the
rental income proved inadequate to meet rising costs. 36  The devel-
oper had to carry this additional burden or else default on the mort-
gage and, in many cases, he chose the latter. Congress eventually
provided additional subsidies to meet these expenses but, by that
time, the Nixon Administration had established section 8 as its own
solution to the low-income housing problem.37
II. SECTION 8: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Section 8 transferred some of LHA's authority to both HUD and
individual owners. In new construction, HUD can enter into a hous-
ing assistance payment contract directly with the owner. 38  In all
cases, the tenant rents directly from the owner, who has full responsi-
34. See Edson, Section 235 and 236-The First Year, 2 URB. LAW. 14 (1970).
35. Hearings on the Suspension of Subsidized Housing Programs Before the Sub-
comm. on Housing ofthe House Banking and Currency Comm., 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 55
(1974). The Administration criticized a number of the public housing programs con-
tained in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, § 201(a), 12 U.S.C. §
1715z-1 (1976). First, the programs failed to primarily serve families with incomes at
below the poverty level. In 1972, the median income level of those served under
section 236 was $5,300, well above the low-income line. Address by Secretary of
HUD, James T. Lynn, at the Third Urban Technology Conference 1973 (excerpts
found in Use Good Existing Housing for the Needy, 89 THE AMERICAN CITY 23,
(1974)). Second, the programs did not afford the poor much choice since the projects
and their mortgages were subsidized. Third, the programs were considered "inordi-
nately costly." Id. at 55.
36. Hearings on the Suspension of Subsidized Housing Programs before the Sub-
comm. on Housing of the House Banking and Currency Comm., 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
56 (1974).
37. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 201(a)(8), 42 U.S.C. §
1437f (Supp. V 1975) (§ 8 of the revised U.S. Housing Act of 1937). Other than
section 23, none of the existing housing programs were specifically dismantled by the
Act. However, it is HUD's intention to use section 8 as the primary housing program.
See Housing and Urban Affairs Daily, Aug. 23, 1974, at 102 (views of former HUD
Secretary James Lynn).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(bX2) (Supp. V 1975). With existing housing, HUD enters
into an ACC with a LHA who, in turn, enters into a subsidy agreement with the
owners. Id. at § 1437f(b)(1).
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bility for rental and management of the unit.39 The owner of the
assisted units receives two separate rent payments, one from the ten-
ant and one from HUD.4"
The tenant's rent payment is limited to twenty-five per cent of his
gross income.4 1 Although the actual rent is usually the twenty-five
per cent maximum, very large low-income families or households
with exceptional medical expenses have a highest rate of only fifteen
per cent.42 Section 8 delegates the responsibility for establishing rent
levels to HUD rather than to local authorities.43
The assistance payment from HUD, which covers the difference
between a tenant's payment and the approved rent, restricts the price
of acceptable units. HUD calculates "a fair market rental" for ex-
isting and newly constructed units of various types and sizes.44 The
maximum rent may not exceed the applicable fair market rent by
more than ten per cent unless HUD determines that local needs re-
quire a twenty per cent excess.45 Assistance contracts must provide
39. 24 C.F.R. § 1273.102(q) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 45170 (1974) (new construction);
24 C.F.R. § 1275.102(q) (1974), 40 Fed. Reg. 3735 (1975) (existing housing).
40. Assistance contracts for newly constructed units may have an initial term of
five years, renewable exclusively by the owner for a total period of thirty years. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1437f(d)(i) (West Supp. 1978). This is similar to a project that is sup-
ported by a state agency. A total period of forty years is possible. 24 C.F.R. §
1273.103(g)(2) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 45272 (1974).
For existing housing the contract term is equal to the length of the lease, which may
vary from one to three years. 24 C.F.R. § 1275.103(f) (1974), 40 Fed. Reg. 3737 (1975).
41. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
42. 42 U.S.C. 1437f(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975). HUD's regulations categorize a house-
hold with six or more minors as "large" and a household with eight or more as "very
large." 24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(t) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 45174 (1974).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
44. Id. at § 1437f(c)(1). Fair Market Rent is defined as "the rent, including utili-
ties (except telephone), ranges and refrigerators, parking and all maintenance, man-
agement and other services, which, as determined at least annually by HUD, would
be required to be paid in order to obtain privately developed and owned, newly con-
structed rental housing of modest (non-luxury) nature with suitable amenities." 24
C.F.R. § 880.102 (1977).
The conferees on the Housing and Community Development Act observed that
"the establishment of realistic fair market rentals will be a prime factor in the success
or failure of the new housing assistance program." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 6, at 139.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975). Any adjustments in a maximum rent
"shall not result in material differences between the rents charged for assisted and
comparable unassisted units." Id. at § 1437f(c)(2)(C). The owner has the burden to
clearly demonstrate the necessity for the increases. E.g., 24 C.F.R. § 880.110(c)
(1976).
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that maximum rents will be adjusted at least annually, either to re-
flect changes in the fair market rent figure or "if the Secretary deter-
mines, on the basis of a reasonable formula.
46
Congress recently amended the section 8 program to extend the
duration of the assistance payment from HUD, and establish a debt
service subsidy in the event of vacancies. As orginally enacted, the
program provided for assistance payments over a twenty year pe-
riod.47 To encourage conventional lending, Congress extended the
allowable federal commitment to a maximum of thirty years.48 Sim-
ilarly, to withdraw the risk of vacancies from the building owner,
Congress provided for a debt service subsidy, which prevents foreclo-
sure during the period of vacancy by authorizing federal payment of
mortgage payment.49
Under the amendments to section 8, eligible "lower-income fami-
lies," are defined as families whose income is eighty per cent or less
of the median income in the area of their residence, with adjustments
for the size of the family.5" Additionally, section 8 requires that at
least thirty per cent of the families assisted have "very low incomes,"
that is, an income level no more than half of the median for the
area.
5
'
A beneficial "economic mix" within developments is promoted not
only by the requirement that very low income households comprise a
portion of each project, but also by the provision of the Act establish-
ing a funding priority for those developments where no more than
twenty per cent of all units are subsidized.52 The statute does allow
subsidies for all units in a project if the project consists of fifty units
or less, or is designed exclusively for the elderly.53
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(c)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
47. Id. at § 1437(e)(1).
48. Id. as amended by Pub. L. 95-24, Title I § 101(c), 91 Stat. 55 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 1437f(e)(1) (West Supp. 1978)).
49. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(4) (Supp. V 1975) with 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437(c)(5)
(West Supp. 1978).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
51. Id. at § 1437f(f)(2). The 30% requirement for very low-income families ap-
plies at the time of initial renting of the dwelling units. Id. at § 1437f(c)(7). See
note 111 infra.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(5) (Supp. V 1975). The 20% preference is used to rank
applications which are received within 60 days. Id. This distribution requirement is
the primary vehicle used to promote "economic mix." Id. § 1437f(a).
53. Id. at § 1437f(c)(5).
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III. SECTION 8 NEW CONSTRUCTION IN PERSPECTIVE
The section 8 program effectuates three basic goals. 4 First, the
program tries to reach those families who need the most help in ob-
taining a decent place to live. 5 Second, the program implements a
policy of racial and economic integration. 6 Third, section 8 is in-
tended to substantially involve the private housing industry, since
private involvement is one way to limit the expense of federal hous-
ing programs. 7
These goals, although laudable standing alone, create problems
when blended together into a functional housing strategy. This sec-
tion examines whether a new construction private market strategy
conflicts with the traditional federal role of providing housing for the
less privileged.
A. Federal Aid vs. Private Profit
To provide decent, safe dwellings for low-income families, section
8 is dependent upon voluntary, active involvement by private devel-
opers. Because the private developer participates only when the op-
portunity for a profit is reasonably certain, the government must
often provide sufficient financial incentives. When federal resources
are limited, the government must hold down its costs while providing
sufficient incentives to encourage active participation. In this light,
section 8 may not motivate private developers to enter the program
and construct new units for low-income families.
Section 8 establishes two financing methods that relieve the private
developer from market uncertainty. First, a rent subsidy system al-
lows the developer to keep abreast of increasing inflation. Second,
54. Section 8 creates three separate categories of assisted housing: existing, new
construction and substantial rehabilitation. The regulations pertaining to new con-
struction and substantial rehabilitation are identical in most respects. Therefore, un-
less otherwise designated, citations concerning these two programs will be made to
new construction.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (Supp. V 1975).
56. Id.
57. CONFERENCE REPORT ON HOUSING & CoMMuNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF
1974, H.R. REP. No. 1279, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PREs. Doc. 1060 (1974) (President Ford's remarks on the Housing & Community
Development Act of 1974). Economic theory generally relies on the principle that
private market activity tends to be less costly than if government provided identical
services. See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 190-95 (1962).
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the program stimulates a demand for new dwellings by increasing the
number of families able to compete in this market.
The rent subsidy system, distinguishing section 8 from all prior
programs, is the key to private involvement. In theory, rent subsi-
dies are effective incentives because the developer is concerned about
rental income as a primary source of profit. The rents must satisfy
finance obligations and operating costs while providing a reasonable
return on the investment.58 Where rents are insufficient to meet
these obligations, a decline in management services, maintenance
and upkeep of the project may result. Also, the developer is likely to
default on his mortgage. Section 8 avoids these difficulties by main-
taining a rent subsidy system tied to the prevailing fair market rent in
a particular geographic area.59
B. Automatic Rent Adjustments
The section 8 program requires an annual rent adjustment to re-
flect changes in the area's fair market rent. Additionally, an increase
is allowed where special circumstances indicate a "substantial general
increase in real property taxes, utility rates or similar costs."6 The
Fair Market Rental (FMR), however, operates as an overall limita-
tion on the contract rent since the statute prohibits the maximum
monthly rent from exceeding the established FMR.61
58. [1976] 4 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 30:0014.
59. "[The section 81 subsidy amount flows from the approved rent rather than
from a fixed amount such as the interest on the mortgage. [Thus], the Section 8
program is able to eliminate one of the major problems that arose in Section 236
projects, the inability without further legislation to increase subsidies to compensate
for the sharp rise in operating costs." G. MILGRAM, THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
SECTION 8 HOusING PROGRAM, reproduced in Hearings Before Subcomm. on Housing
A Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency & Housing,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1975).
See W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBURG, URBAN HOUSING POLICY, 165-75 (1975),
where the authors discuss the economics of low-rent housing. Over 10% of cash in
flow, an amount equal to about 80% of net income, is dissipated by expenditures on
low-rent units that do not contribute to any improvement or maintenance of housing
services. Id. at 171. In part, this explains why housing quality in the inner city is
inferior.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(2XB) (Supp. IV 1974). The regulation, 24 C.F.R. §
880.110(c) (1976), provided that an owner must clearly demonstrate that the annual
automatic increase is inadequate to meet his operating costs.
61. The maximum contract rent may exceed the FMR by up to 10% if the field
office determines that special circumstances warrant such higher rent, or by up to 20%
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By providing for annual automatic and special circumstance ad-
justments in the contract rent, the system benefits both the owner and
tenant. The owner is insulated against spiraling operational ex-
penses and real estate taxes, lessening the pressure to reduce serv-
ices.62 Furthermore, since his rental contribution is fixed, the tenant
is not forced to absorb these increasing costs.
63
Although automatic rent adjustments enhance the program's at-
tractiveness, its key lies in determinating the FMR." Clearly, a high
FMR means a greater return for the developer. A provision viewed
favorably by developers requires an annual adjustment in the FMR.
However, the upward adjustment limit, since not statutorily deter-
mined, is subject to HUD discretion. In calculating the FMR, an area
HUD office must consider "factual data, analyses, and recommenda-
tions from community sources familiar with prevailing rents and
costs; tak[ing] into account the need to provide housing with suitable
amenities. '65  Regardless of these procedural constraints, the final
FMR is within HUD's discretion.6
if the Regional Administrator determines such higher rent is necessary to the imple-
mentation of a Local Housing Assistance Plan. 24 C.F.R. § 880.108(a)(1)(2) (1976),
62. T. DUVALL & E. WHITE, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON SECTION 8: LOWER-
INCOME HOUSING ASSISTANCE (1975); Note, The Housing and Community Develop.
ment Act of 1974-ho Shall Live in Public Housing?, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 320
(1976).
63. Section 8 avoids one of public housing's most formidable problems-how to
deal with rapidly rising costs and fixed revenues. Under the conventional housing
program, LHA's are caught in a financial crunch. Prohibited by statute from raising
the tenant's rent, the LHA and HUD have been unable to persuade the courts that
staggering losses justify avoiding the statutory ceiling. See, e.g., National Tenants
Organization, Inc. v. HUD, 358 F. Supp. 312 (D.D.C. 1973); Barber v. White, 351 F.
Supp. 1091 (D. Conn. 1972).
Note that any change in the tenant's income affects the amount the tenant must
contribute. As income increases, the amount of the rent subsidy will decrease. Con-
sequently, it is in HUD's best interest to house tenants with relatively stable sources of
income to avoid possible decreases in future rent receipts.
64. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 313.
65. The procedure for calculating the Fair Market Rental is specified in U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SECTION 8 HOUSING ASSISTANCE
PAYMENTS PROGRAM: NEw CONSTRUCTION PROCESSING HANDBOOK, ch. 8 at 8-10
(April 1975) [hereinafter cited as SECTION 8 HANDBOOK]. Basically, the area office
valuation branch must construct hypothetical dwelling units and, from samples of
market units drawn throughout the housing submarket, a comparable rent may be
derived. Certain types of units may not be used as samples, such as HUD insured
units. Once the comparable unit is determined, certain adjustments must be made
because of the difference in utility and services provided. Id.
66. HUD has been slow in promulgating revised yearly FMR's. It is a difficult
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The federal government and the private developer do not have
harmonious roles. HUD's motivation involves keeping the FMR as
low as possible.67 By committing the government to a thirty-year
participation, with an expectation of cost increases, HUD must either
restrict its fund commitments or maintain the FMR at low levels.
Yet with a policy of providing as many units as possible within the
budgetary limit, the latter approach seems the only alternative.
C. The Comparability Rule
The comparability rule, an element of the rent subsidy system, fur-
ther limits the upward adjustment of rents by providing that revision
of maximum rents "shall not result in material differences between
the rents charged for assisted and comparable unassisted units. 6 8
The comparability rule, in essence, compares the reasonableness of
the rent to unsubsidized "equivalent living accommodations and
services."' 69 The rule attempts to prevent inefficiency by allowing the
market place to dictate what is "reasonable" in rents and which oper-
ations, government or private, are efficient.70 As a practical conse-
quence, HUD field offices must assess the proposed (or revised) rent
in relation to "samples of market rent comparables drawn from
surveys for differing unit size and structure type" in the particular
submarket of the intended project.7
In its original interpretation of the comparability rule, HUD con-
strued "material differences" to mean that the contract rent of an as-
sisted unit could vary no more than five per cent from the rent
task to revise the rents and some developers advocate retroactive application once the
FMR's are eventually established. [1977] 5 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 22.
67. "Acceptable schedules of Fair Market Rents [should not be] high enough to
support the production cost of inefficient developers or to encourage the production of
units that are not modest in design." SECTION 8 HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at ch. 8,
§ 8-3, at 6. In light of the need to guard against unforeseeable cost increases in the
future, HUD must either restrict its commitment of housing funds or maintain the
FMR at lower levels that still entice developers. See Hearings Before Subcomrt on
Housing & Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and
Housing: The Implementation of Section 8, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 880.110(d) (1977).
69. SECTION 8 HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at § 9-3.
70. See note 57 supra.
71. The appraiser must also consider the rates of change in construction costs,
utility expenses, financing charges, and the effect they are likely to have on the rates
of change of market rent. SECTION 8 HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at § 9-3.
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charged for a comparable unassisted unit.72 This variance was avail-
able only when one hundred per cent of the project was assisted.73
This position chilled private development because it failed to account
for the added expense of dealing with the federal government.74
Responding to criticism, HUD recently modified the comparability
test. Changes now allow a ten per cent variation in contract rents to
reflect higher management costs regardless of the number of assisted
units.7' Furthermore, a five per cent increase is allowed, at field of-
fice discretion, when the developer can demonstrate that unique mar-
ket conditions justify the increase. 76  Before rental adjustments are
allowed, the project must undergo a strict examination, including a
full cost analysis.77 These modifications provide added flexibility
without impinging on justifiable rental charges. Nevertheless, the
comparability rule continues as the object of sharp criticism by pri-
vate developers who argue that the rule is merely a device to hold
down FMR's and thereby lessen funding commitments. By compar-
ing only existing unassisted units, the rule fails to account for the
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Current Developments, [1977] 4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 729. Low-income
families, in the past, required a number of services and amenities that private land-
lords are not normally equipped to provide, which serve to raise the rents above phys-
icaly comparable units in the unsubsidized market. "These needs may range from
extra janitorial services through budget counseling and provision of space for day
care centers." G. MILGRAM, THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SECTION 8 HoUsINO
PROGRAM, note 59 supra.
75. Current Developments, [1977] 4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 729-32.
76. Id. The rule can be applied with such flexibility that it undercuts its own
purpose. For example, an area office, charged with the responsibility of defining the
relevant submarket, might focus on an area of rental housing in the metropolitan area
that attracts premium rents.
77. The test, in addition, includes a showing that the developers made a "consci-
entious effort" to plan a feasible project. Owners must show that higher rents are
necessary and that the existing housing supply is inadequate to meet local housing
needs. Current Developments, [1977] 4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 731.
The legislative history indicates that the comparability rule was intended to assure
"that higher costs resulting from inefficient management practices are not compen-
sated by increase in the subsidy. Thus, a housing owner whose operating cost in-
creases are out of line with increases in comparable projects . . . may not increase
rents and would have to either absorb the operating increase, or preferably, take effec-
tive remedial action with respect to its management problems." House Comm. Re-
port on the Housing and Development Act of 1974, H.R. REP. No. 1114, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 371-72 (1974).
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replacement cost of a unit in a period of inflation. As a result,
HUD's FMR calculations are too low to support a feasible project.
The comparability rule hinders the program in other ways, as well.
For example, a developer who finances his project through the Fed-
eral Housing Authority (FHA) must comply with costly site selection
criteria.78 Requiring compliance with the Davis-Bacon federal mini-
mum wage requirements renders projects more costly.79 The rule
neglects whether any premium should be granted to developers to
encourage low-income family units.
D. Financing
Favorable financing is crucial to the success of any apartment de-
velopment. As originally enacted, Congress provided various financ-
ing methods,8" but HUD preferred that private lenders would form
the primary financing force behind section 8.81 Conventional financ-
ing imposes fewer direct costs on the federal government and is con-
sistent with maximizing private involvement in the program. Private
lenders are reluctant to provide financing, however, because of legal
and financial complications. Prior to the recent amendments, lend-
ers were hesitant to participate because the risk of vacancies was
placed entirely on the owner.8" Also, the law provided assistance
payments to extend only twenty years, while conventional loan terms
78. 24 C.F.R. § 880.111-.112 (1977). COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MAJOR CHANGES ARE NEEDED IN THE NEW
LEASED-HoUSING PROJECT 24-25 (1977).
79. 24 C.F.R. § 880.114(d) (1977). The Carter administration is considering
abandoning the comparability rule. While no definite decision has been reached,
HUD could adopt a policy of adjusting comparable rents for cost factors rather than
abandon comparability completely. Current Developments, [1977] 5 Hous. & DEv.
REP. (BNA) 9.
80. 24 CF.R. § 880.115(a) (1977) provides that "any type of financing may be
utilized" including the following: 1) conventional loans; 2) mortgage insurance pro-
grams under the National Housing Act; 3) section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959; 4)
Title V of the Housing Act of 1949; and 5) financing by tax-emempt bonds or other
obhgations.
81. Hearings on the Housing Authorization Act of 1976 Before the Subcomm. on
Housing and Community Development of the House Comm, on Banking, Currency and
Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1975) (statement of former HUD Secretary Carla
Hills).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e)(1) (Supp. V 1975) permits the assistance payments to
continue over a forty-year period if the project is owned or financed by a state or local
agency.
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83customarily last for thirty to forty years. Congress subsequently
corrected these impediments so that owners are now entitled to a debt
subsidy in the event of vacancy, 4 and the federal commitment ex-
tends to thirty years.85
Despite the recent changes, conventional financing for low-income
family units remains unattractive to both lenders and developers.8 6
Lender hesitancy arises out of fear that a multi-family unit contain-
ing low-income subsidized families will scare non-assisted market
renters away. The perceived result is ultimate foreclosure on the
loan, making the lender unwilling to participate in a "social experi-
ment."8" Owners, too, are often reluctant to use conventional financ-
ing since lenders may require the developer to be personally liable as
security for the loan.
Various alternative financing mechanisms do exist. For example,
many developers can obtain a loan insured by the Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) under the Government National Market Associa-
tion (GNMA) Tandem Plan. 8 Under the Tandem Plan, GNMA in-
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(e)(1) (Supp. V 1975). Presumably, a twenty-year subsidy
would not have been unattractive if the term of the mortgage were also twenty years.
However, since the FMR is based on current rents, and the comparability rule prohib-
its material variations in rents of assisted and unassisted units, the rents could not be
set at a level high enough to support amortization over this shorter period.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(4) (Supp. V 1975). The Senate bill originally provided
that assistance payments would continue with respect to an unoccupied unit only
where the tenant vacates before the expiration of the lease and the owner is making a
good faith effort to fill the vacancy. The Conference Committee adopted these two
provisions, but in the alternative. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 1141.
Hearings on the Housing Authorization Act of 1976 Before the Subcomm. on Housing
and Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency & Housing,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32(1975). See also G. MILGRAM, THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
SEcToN 8 PROGRAM, note 50 supra.
85. See note 48 supra.
86. H.R. REP. No. 42, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-15 (1977) reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 580-86 [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET RE-
PORT 1977].
87. COMPrROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 76, at 61. The
CONGRESSIONAL. BUDGET REPORT 1977, supra note 86, suggests another reason for
conventional lender reluctance. The report notes that most section 8 projects are
used as tax shelters. Utilizing accelerated depreciation to enjoy current tax deduc-
tions, all tax deduction benefits cease after 20 years. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1954). At that
point, the owners either sell, abandon or refinance their dwellings. Given a continu-
ing inflationary spiral, the temptation to sell may be irresistible, a situation viewed as
too risky by the lender.
88. See Fitzpatrick, FHA and FNMA Assistancefor Multi-family Housing, 32
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 439 (1967).
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tervenes in the secondary mortgage market, purchasing low-interest
rate mortgages at market rates and reselling them to the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association (FNMA). 9 GNMA absorbs the differ-
ential in interest points, forming a subsidy, to encourage lower
interest lending for low-income projects. From the developer's
standpoint, Tandem Plan financing is attractive because of the lower
interest rates on the loan.' Also, because of FHA insurance, the
developer is not personally liable for the loan. These advantages,
however, must be balanced against numerous drawbacks, including
delays associated with FHA processing, a need'to undergo both FHA
and section 8 processing, and the stringent cost analysis involved in
FHA processing.9 Furthermore, the developer incurs additional
costs through this financing method because of exacting property and
building standards required to receive an FMA commitment.92 Fi-
nally, uncertainty surrounding the continuation of the Tandem Plan
forces developers to look for other financing avenues.
93
A state Housing Finance Agency (HFA) serves as another financ-
ing source.9 4 Essentially, a state HFA provides developers with be-
low market interest rates on both construction and long-term loans.
The HFA raises funds for re-lending principally from the sale of tax-
exempt revenue bonds,95 which are then retired through mortgage
payments made by the developer. Unlike those issued by the federal
government, these bonds are not backed by the state's full faith and
credit, but rather are secured through the state's "moral obligation"
to pay. Although this is, in effect, an authorization to obtain state
funds in the event of any deficiencies, the obligation is not legally
binding.
96
89. 12 U.S.C. § 1720(j) (1976).
90. See W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBURG, URBAN HOUSING POLICY 173 (1975),
which illustrates how a lower debt service commitment, accomplished through lower
interest rates, increases cash flow. See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REP. 1977, note
86 5upra; A. SOLOMON, HOUSING THE URBAN POOR (1974).
91. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 76, at 62.
92. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, A COMPARATIVE ANALY-
SIS OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSING COSTS (1976).
93. Current Developments, [1977] 5 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 544.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1440 (Supp. V 1975) specifically authorizes financing through a
state housing finance agency.
95. See note 80 supra; I.R.C. § 103.
96. For examples of "moral obligation" clauses, see MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16.114
(1972); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 67 1/2 § 301 (Cum. Supp. 1972). See also Development of
State Housing Finance Agencies, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 471, 471-74 (1974).
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State HFA financing has many advantages for both the developer
and for low-income families. The primary benefit to the developer is
an ability to secure lower-interest loans without the cumbersome time
delays associated with FHA Tandem financing.97 Eligible low-in-
come families benefit, too, since the state agency can easily adapt to
local community needs. Furthermore, since an HFA provides an effi-
cient, low-cost financing source, the agency can exert pressure on the
developer to make a project available to families.9" State HFA
financing, despite all of its advantages, is used reluctantly, perhaps
due to unfavorable publicity surrounding New York City's financial
crisis. A near default by the New York Urban Development Corpo-
ration put the "moral obligation" bond to the test.
While recent indications reveal renewed confidence in moral obli-
gation notes issued by state HFA's,9 9 another financing mechanism,
section 1 l(b), l° alleviates the difficulty of marketing moral obliga-
tion bonds. 10 1 Under the section 11(b) program, HUD, not the In-
ternal Revenue Service, grants an exemption from federal income
taxation to obligations issued by a public housing agency, or any in-
strumentality thereof, for producing low-income housing. 10 2 Section
11 (b) has numerous advantages, which include avoiding the "stigma"
of a state moral obligation bond, escaping state ceilings on indebted-
ness, and easy administration. This last benefit is derived from ex-
panding the definition of public housing authority to include
instrumentalities or agents, making it possible for a group of develop-
ers to form a public housing organization and issue tax-exempt bonds
without numerous intervening parties. Nevertheless there is no as-
surance that investors will purchase bonds, the proceeds of which are
used to house low-income families as opposed to other eligible, more
97. 24 C.F.R. § 883 (1977) provides for quick state HFA-section 8 processing by
allowing the state agency to process the funds without a simultaneous review by
HUD.
98. Current Developments, [1978] 6 HOUSING & DEv. REP. (BNA) 30:00014, dem-
onstrates that HUD intends to increase this important HFA function. HUD, there-
fore, intends to require HFA's to allocate a greater percentage of funds to units for
families.
99. The attractiveness of this technique is evident in the favorable bond ratings by
Moody's. See Current Developments, [1977] 5 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 567.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. V 1975).
101. See Current Developments, [1975] 5 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 567.
102. 24 C.F.R. § 811.105 (1977); 24 C.F.R. § 811.102(c) (1977).
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stable low-income groups.10 3
III. MAXIMIZING PRIVATE CONTROL VS. HOUSING THE LOWER-
INCOME FAMILY
This section examines another conflict between the goal of aiding
the poor and the goal of encouraging private industry involvement.
Specifically, this section questions whether the section 8 new con-
struction program can successfully house needy lower-income fami-
lies.
Section 8 provides owner incentives by increasing demand for new
multi-family dwellings. In theory, an increase in demand enhances
an owner's profitability since the increase improves the chance for
maintaining a project at full occupancy."° An increase in demand
may also push market rents higher.'0 5 It is arguable, however,
whether an increase in demand is sufficient to prompt a developer
into undertaking a section 8 project specifically for low-income fami-
lies. First of all, an adequate demand may already exist such that
any futher increase would lack the motivating effect on a developer to
undertake a low-income family housing development. Also, demand
is only one of many factors a developer considers when contemplat-
ing a project."° Thus, section 8 motivation, by itself, would be
insufficient to generate the necessary private industry response to
assure the program's success.
From the tenant family's perspective, emphasizing new construc-
tion while simultaneously increasing demand is logically unsound be-
cause the supply never satisfies the demand for these units.
103. 24 C.F.R. § 811.102 (1977) defines "low-income housing" to include housing
occupied by moderate-income families, elderly and the handicapped.
104. D. MANDELKER & R. MONTGOMERY, HOUSING IN AMERICA (1973); Downs,
Housing the Urban Poor- The Economics of Various Strategies, 59 AM. ECON. REV.
646 (1969); What Form Should Housing Subsidies Take?, 31 J. HOUSING 160 (1974)
(discussing the difference between production oriented subsidies and demand subsi-
dies).
105. Advocates of new construction maintain that reliance on existing housing
will cause severely inflated rents because of the lack of adequate existing supply. T.
DUVALL & E. WHITE, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON SECTION 8: LOWER INCOME
HOUSING ASSISTANCE (1975). See also W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBURG, URBAN
HOUSING POLICY (1975); A. SOLOMON, HOUSING THE URBAN POOR (1974); Whit-
man, Federal Housing Assistancefor the Poor. Old Problems and New Directions, 9
URB. LAW. 1 (1977).
106. Mortgage interest rates and construction costs are equally as important as
demand to prospective developers.
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Additionally, a new construction strategy aggravates the notion of
"horizontal inequality"1 °7 because few people receive the benefits of
a new unit, with its corresponding amenities, whereas other eligible
persons must remain in older housing. Furthermore, the initial cost
per family is greatest where new construction provides housing, and
its cost effectiveness remains doubtful.108
The section 8 new construction program is likely to discriminate
against certain low-income families. First, the eligibility income lim-
its for prospective tenants are designed to permit greater eligibility
than allowed in past housing programs. Second, in the new construc-
tion area, the Act creates a trade off: To involve the private sector in
the program, the tenant must forego many rights established in other
housing programs.
A. Eligibility
Section 8 eligibility income limits correspond to an area's median
income.109 By defining eligibility in this fashion, rather than tying it
to an officially established poverty level, greater numbers can partici-
pate.110 Consequently, not only is the owner entitled to greater se-
lectivity, but the amount of available assistance must be spread out
over a larger group. Low-income families, who need the most help,
suffer greatest since a less concentrated effort is expended for their
benefit.
B. The Trade Off
The success of section 8 depends upon "aiding lower-income fami-
lies in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically
mixed housing." '' The program, however, delegates to owners of
107. A. SOLOMON, HOUSING THE URBAN POOR 17-18 (1975).
108. Id. at 69-70. Solomon charts out the consumption benefits per family (bene-
fit = market rent - tenant rent) under various housing strategies. He concludes that,
within the confines of a limited federal budget, the cost of new construction is sub-
stantially outweighed by its consumption benefit and therefore any housing strategy
must consider equity cost effectiveness and political acceptability. See also Whit-
man, supra note 7, at 36-38.
109. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
110. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, COMPARATIVE COSTS AND EsTI-
MATED HOUSEHOLDS ELIGIBLE FOR PARTICIPATION IN CERTAIN FEDERALLY As-
sisTED Low INCOME HOUSING PROGRAMS, prepared for Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
111. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
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newly-constructed units "all ownership, management and mainte-
nance responsibilities, including the selection of tenants and the ter-
mination of tenancy.""' 2 Outside of selection procedures, there are
some regulations owners must follow.13 Every family must fill out
an application for admission that is to be maintained by an owner to
provide racial, ethnic and gender data that ensures compliance with
Equal Opportunity requirements. 1 4 However, the owner may avoid
this requirement if there are no vacancies and his waiting list is such
that, for an unreasonable length of time, the applicant could not be
admitted." 5 Yet the regulations fail to define "an unreasonable
length of time" and, presumably, the owner may interpret that phrase
as he wishes.
HUD regulations require all proposals to contain assurances that
the owner will comply with both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which require
racial equality in government-supported housing.' 16 Also, projects
planned for five units or more require an Affirmative Fair Housing
Marketing Plan, which states methods of recruiting minorities for oc-
cupancy in assisted units."'
Responsibility for terminating tenancies is placed on the owner of
a new construction project."' HUD does not require any particular
eviction process unless an owner wishes to qualify for temporary
assistance payments where a low-income family is evicted."'
Specifically, the family must have "written notice of the proposed
eviction, stating the grounds and advising the [flamily that it has [ten]
112. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975) (new construction) with 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (existing housing). With respect to existing
housing, the owner is far more restricted in tenant selection procedures, and he has no
right to evict.
113. 24 C.F.R. § 880.218(b)(I), (5) (1977) requires compliance with equal oppor-
tunity guidelines when marketing and operating the project.
114. 24 C.F.L § 880.218(b)(2) (1977).
115. Id. There is no requirement that the owner demonstrate to the applicant
proof that the unit is in fact occupied.
116. 24 C.F.R. § 880.114(a) (1977).
117. 24 C.F.R. § 880.209(7) (1977). See Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing
Regulations, 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.600-.640 (1977). Acceptable Affirmative Fair Housing
Marketing plans include advertising through minority media and requiring develop-
ers to display fair housing signs at the project site.
118. See footnote 112 and accompanying text supra.
119. See footnote 121 and accompanying text infra.
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days within which to present its objections."' 2° The eviction must
not violate the lease, the assistance contract, or any local law.1 21
Granting the owner virtually exclusive control over tenant selec-
tion and eviction creates possible discriminatory consequences.
Along with the transfer of management and maintenance responsibil-
ities, the private owner should also bear some risk of tenant defaults
and damage to the dwelling. 22 These considerations are likely to
affect evaluation of prospective tenants. Consequently, an owner
may frown upon applicants from lower-income groups that may be
stereotyped as unstable. Where plans call for a mix of residents,
with some units occupied by tenants paying full market rent, the
owner will be motivated to select only those lower-income persons
who will not disturb or offend neighboring "market renters." Both
considerations, management and tenant relations, discourage ac-
cepting families that show any social undesirability. Finally, the
program has no requirement that an eviction occur only for cause. 123
This is critical to the tenant since, in a market where demand exceeds
supply, the owner's waiting list allows him to fill units with "pre-
ferred" families. In this particular instance, the dwelling remains
unoccupied for such a short time that the owner does not need a tem-
porary assistance payment, and need not comply with the notification
procedure.' 24
120. 24 C.F.R. § 880.107(c)(2) (1977).
121. Id.
122. Note, The Leased Housing Progranv How Tenantable a Proposition? 26 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 1145, 1197-1200 (1975); Note, Federal Leased HousingAssistance in Private
Accomodations: Section 8, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 676 (1975).
123. To receive an assistance payment for vacancies during the rent-up period, an
owner must show that he has not rejected any eligible applicant except for good cause
(acceptable to HUD). 24 C.F.R. § 880.107(b) (1977). This implies that the omission
of the requirement that evictions occur for cause was a deliberate choice by HUD.
See 24 C.F.R. § 880.220 (1977).
124. This tactic would be possible only in a seller's market, which is frequently
the case where low-priced rental housing is concerned. Compare 24 C.F.R. §
880.107(c) (1977) with 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1977). Evictions from existing units are
the "sole right" of the public housing agency, "with the owner having the right to
make representation to the agency for termination." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)
(Supp. V 1975). As with new construction, the regulations require written notice of
the proposed eviction, but the LHA must examine the grounds for eviction authoriz-
ing the eviction unless it finds the grounds insufficient under the lease. Id. Tenants
and applicants have the right to a hearing when faced with eviction. See, e.g.,
Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1003 (1971) (conventional public housing) (1971); Escalera v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (same); Joy v. Daniels,
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The tenant is in a precarious position, both in securing a unit and
during occupancy. Rather than promulgating rules that relieve this
situation, HUD chose not to take any remedial action that limits an
owner's discretion and might jeopardize the involvement of the pri-
vate sector. Some commentators suggest, however, that procedural
due process rights afforded tenants under prior law are still available
to the tenant in a section 8 project. This issue remains to be decided
in the courts.125 However, if procedural due process guarantees ap-
ply to the new construction program, voluntary participation may be
curtailed since private owners face possible liability for constitutional
violations. 126
C. Promoting Economic Integration vs. Housing the Poor
Section 8 seeks two conflicting goals: promoting economic integra-
tion in assisted units and providing housing to lower-income families.
The following discussion illustrates the tension between these goals,
at the same time reflecting the underlying issue of whether social
goals conflict with housing goals.
The tenant selection process is guided by a congressionally man-
dated policy of promoting an economic mixture of families in avail-
able projects, a statutorily created priority for those projects where no
479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973)
(federally subsidized housing). U.S. DEP'T. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEvELOPMENT,
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE IN LOW-RENT PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS (Feb. 22, 1971).
See generaly Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86
HARV. L. REV. 880 (1973); Note, The Leased Housing Progran How Tenantable a
Proposition? 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1145, 1176-1200 (1975).
125. To make the procedural due process argument, a tenant faces some difficulty
in satisfying the state action requirement considering the use of privately-owned
dwellings, and the possibility of mixtures of assisted and unassisted families. See
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-66 (1970). It should be possible to obtain proce-
dural due process guarantees without overcoming this hurdle. See Bishop, Assisted
Housing Under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 8 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 672, 682-83 (Supp. Jan. 1975). This author suggests using the fifth
amendment since the test of public action under the fifth amendment is substantially
the same as that for state action under the fourteenth amendment. This conceivably
may be satisfied through the deep federal government involvement with the program
at every level.
126. Note, The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974-Who Shall
Live in Public Housing? 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 320, 333-34 (1976). But see Note, The
New Leased Housing Program: How Tenantable a Proposition? 26 HASTINGS L.J.
1145, 1183-94 (1975).
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more than twenty per cent of the tenants will be assisted families.' 27
This policy tries to promote dispersal of the poor away from concen-
trated urban areas, while encouraging social integration among eco-
nomic classes of people. 128
The economic mix concept in the new construction area is opposed
by developers who argue that high construction costs force high
FMR's. High rents mean that only comparatively wealthy families,
a group who would be reluctant to move into a subsidized building,
could afford unsubsidized housing.'29 Moreover, strict adherence to
the twenty per cent preference could mean a prohibitively expensive
program because developers would be forced to build market com-
petitive units with many amenities and larger floor plans, necessitat-
ing higher development costs. 3
Perhaps out of a fear of antagonizing the private developer, the
priority is now only a paper tiger. 31 The preference is limited to
sixty days. More importantly, the law exempts from this priority sys-
tem any development of fifty units or less and projects designed for
the elderly and handicapped.132 Since it is relatively inefficient to
operate smaU projects, there will not be many such developments.
However, developments for the elderly and handicapped may consti-
tute a substantial part of the new construction program if developer
animosity to the economic mix concept remains. 133
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(5) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 880.104(a) (1977).
128. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 309. A similar policy was contained
in the section 23 program, although the policy had little practical effect. See Fried-
man & Krier, supra note 21, at 618-19.
129. According to a survey by the National Association of Housing and Redevel-
opment Officials, a diverse socio-economic mix was not a deterrent to people seeking
housing under the section 23 program. The study found that tenants look at good
design and maintenance. Even if the tenants do not mind integration, the owners
may be unaware of this fact or may fear damage to the image of the building. See D.
MANDELKER & R. MONTGOMERY, HousNG IN AMERICA 402 (1973); Bryan, Can
"Economic Mix" in Housing Work? 31 J. HousING 367 (1974).
130. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 78, at 35.
Whitman, supra note 7 at 29.
13 1. Welfeld, The Section 8 Leasing Program .4 New Program in an Old Rut,
[1975] 2 HousING & DEv. REP (BNA) 1106, 1107.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(5) (Supp. V 1975).
133. "Under (Section 8), the builders become the housing managers. It would
seem that since they must rent out the units, they will seek the elderly, those without
children and the upper reaches of low and moderate income families." 120 CONG.
REc. 28141 (1974). The most recent statistics seem to bear out this early statement:
(Vol. 15:279
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IV. FUTURE PROSPECTS
In order for the section 8 New Construction Program to be a suc-
cessful housing strategy it must overcome numerous conflicting goals.
The program, although dependent upon private housing industry in-
volvement, lacks sufficient incentives to entice this group. While the
rent subsidy system is an attractive feature, developers may feel re-
luctant to participate in the program knowing that HUD controls the
system and that their interests are not necessarily in harmony with
HUD's. Also, with respect to new construction, those most in need
of decent housing are not likely to benefit where the developer-owner
is charged with exclusive management responsibility.
Section 8 is designed to utilize not only new construction, but also
existing and substantially rehabilitated housing. An existing housing
emphasis holds several advantages. Tenants are assured of more ad-
equate procedural due process guarantees since LHA takes a more
active role in the program.' This aids in preventing discriminatory
practices that reduce the effectiveness of the program in housing
those who need the most help. Also, a greater dispersal of low-in-
come families is possible because, unlike new construction, there are
no exclusionary zoning ordinances that preclude a family from rent-
ing an apartment. 35 The initial costs to the government are substan-
SECTION 8 NEW CONSTRUCTION STARTS AND COMPLETIONS
TO DECEMBER 31,1975
Section 8
nvitauon Prehminary HAP
for Proposals Apphcations Apphcations HAP ACC Agreement HAP
Proposals Approved Received Approved List Approval Approved (1) Executed (2)
TOTAL 76.646 14,298 207,057 125,882 81.169 1,471 279
ELDERLY 39,631 10,823 86,539 53.761 29,357 958 279
% of TOTAL
FOR
ELDERLY 51.7% 75.7% 41.8% 42.7% 31.6% 65.1% 100.0%
COLUMN _
(I) Construction Started
(2) Construction Completed
Source: 1975 Statistical Yearbook of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development 107, Table 6
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(dXl) (Supp. V 1975).
135. Exclusionary zoning practices by suburban municipalities operate as an ef-
fective bar to constructing low-income family units. Under the section 8 new con-
struction program, the owner is responsible for obtaining land with suitable zoning
for multi-family uses. 24 C.F.R. § 880.204(h) (1977). In addition, HUD standards
mandate that projects not be located in an area of minority concentration and shall
promote a greater choice of housing opportunities. Id. at § 880.112(c)(1), (d). Sub-
urban locations, therefore, are the most desirable areas, given the availability of va-
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tialy smaller, meaning that greater numbers of eligible families can
participate. 36  One final advantage is perhaps the most important:
Emphasizing existing housing bolsters private real estate while main-
taining the viability of neighborhoods.'37 In most urban areas a sur-
plus of existing housing has decayed due to the inability of owners to
meet maintenance expenses. 138  Section 8, by assuring the owner of a
steady cash flow from subsidized rents, provides a source of funds to
maintain the housing units.
New construction programs do have merit. Where the existing
housing supply is inadequate, or where high unemployment exists,
new construction may be necessary. However, new construction
should be viewed as a production strategy that serves an economic
function as well as a housing function. New construction is most
useful in housing the elderly and moderate-income families. Rely-
ing on existing housing for the elderly is impractical or excessively
expensive since their needs are more exacting. Using new construc-
tion to house moderate-income families avoids the political
prejudices against housing the poor in "luxury."' 3 9 Finally, where
new construction is pursued as a strategy for housing the poor, it
cant land. Suburban communities, however, have been slow to respond to the need
for low-income housing. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See generally Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measur-
ing the Invisible Wall- Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82
YALE L.J. 483 (1973); Burns, Class Struggle in the Suburbs Exiusionary Zoning
Against the Poor, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 79 (1975); Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening
up the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509
(1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645
(1971).
136. GAO, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSING COSTS (1976).
137. W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBURG, URBAN HOUSING POLICY (1975); A. SOLO-
MON, HOUSING THE URBAN POOR 176 (1974). Both authors believe that the federal
commitment to new construction is only a commitment to physical structures but does
not aid in stabilizing or upgrading neighborhoods. They further state that a success-
ful housing program cannot divorce itself from a neighborhood revitalization pro-
gram. See note 6 supra. The advantages of emphasizing section 8 existing housing
are discussed in S.W. Green, The Role ofHUD in Recycling the Cities in the 1970's and
1980s, in RECYCLING INNER CITY REAL ESTATE (1976). Cf. A Federal Strategyfor
Neighborhood Rehabilitation and Preservation, 11 HARV. J. LEGls. 509-38 (1974).
138. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
139. OhIs, Public Policy Toward Low-Income Housing and Filtering in Housing
Markets, 2 J. URBAN ECON. 144 (1975). The author makes the point that increasing
low-income purchasing power will ultimately filter upward, increasing the demand
for new construction for all income levels. Id. at 171. See also Welfeld, Rent Supple-
ments and the Subsidy Dilemma, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 465 (1967).
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could be more effectively implemented through other programs, such
as mortgage subsidies.
Whatever strategy is utilized, it is crucial that the goals be identi-
fied to better understand the possible consequences. The section 8
new construction program, like other programs, contains its own in-
ternal conflicts. Yet realizing this tension helps ensure flexibility in
administration, and allows intelligent decisions regarding policy pri-
orities rather than a policy shaped by the strongest market force.
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